UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION

DERRICK L. WARREN, : Case No. 1:22-cv-231

Plaintiff,

District Judge Timothy S. Black

Magistrate Judge Stephanie K. Bowman

ODRC - LECI, : REPORT AND

Defendant. RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, an inmate at the Lebanon Correctional Institution, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendant "ODRC – LECI." By separate Order issued this date, plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This matter is before the Court for a *sua sponte* review of the complaint to determine whether the complaint, or any portion of it, should be dismissed because it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. *See* Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 804, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); § 805, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

Screening of Plaintiff's Complaint

A. Legal Standard

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal *in forma pauperis* statute, seeking to "lower judicial access barriers to the indigent." *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In doing so, however, "Congress recognized that 'a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits." *Id.* at 31 (quoting *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490

U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e)(1) as part of the statute, which provides in pertinent part:

- (2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—
- * * *
- (B) the action or appeal—
- (i) is frivolous or malicious;
- (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
- (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); *Denton*, 504 U.S. at 31. *See also* § 1915A(b). Thus, § 1915(e) requires *sua sponte* dismissal of an action upon the Court's determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). *See also Hill v. Lappin*, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) "imposes legal *and* factual demands on the authors of complaints." *16630 Southfield Ltd.*, *P'Ship v. Flagstar Bank*, *F.S.B.*, 727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).

Although this pleading standard does not require "detailed factual allegations,' . . . [a]

¹ Formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).

pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint will not "suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" *Id.* (quoting *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 557). Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility is established "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. "The plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for the defendant's conduct." Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted). Further, the Court holds pro se complaints "to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Garrett v. Belmont Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't., No. 08-3978, 2010 WL 1252923, at *2 (6th Cir. April 1, 2010) (quoting *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient treatment, however, has limits; "courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted." Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App'x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)).

B. Allegations in the Complaint

In the complaint, plaintiff alleges that his personal property was taken in connection with him being placed in "the hole" on January 1, 2022. Plaintiff indicates that he refused to sign the "Pack-Up Property Waiver" form because he was not present when his belongings were taken.

According to plaintiff, upon the return of his personal belongings several items were missing

including family pictures, obituaries, and legal work. (Doc. 1-1, Complaint at PageID 8).

As relief, plaintiff seeks monetary damages. (*Id.* at PageID 9).

C. Analysis

Plaintiff's complaint is subject to dismissal at the screening stage. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b).

As noted above, plaintiff names the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction -Lebanon Correctional Institution as the sole defendant to this action. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that "[e]very person who, under the color of any statute . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured " 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A correctional facility is not a "person" subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Parker v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 65 F. App'x. 922, 923 (6th Cir. 2003) (Department of Corrections not a "person" under § 1983). See also, e.g., McGlone v. Warren Corr. Inst., No. 1:13cv126, 2013 WL 1563265, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 12, 2013) (Bowman, M.J.) (Report & Recommendation) (and numerous cases cited therein) (holding that claims against a state prison and the ODRC should be dismissed at the screening stage because "neither the state prison facility nor the state corrections department is an entity capable of being sued under § 1983"), adopted, 2013 WL 2352743 (S.D. Ohio May 29, 2013) (Dlott, J.); see also Hix v. Tennessee Dep't of Corr., 196 F. App'x 350, 355-56 (6th Cir. 2006) (and cases cited therein); Rodgers v. Michigan Dep't of Corr., 29 F. App'x 259, 260 (6th Cir. 2002). Furthermore, because plaintiff only seeks monetary damages as relief in this action, the Eleventh Amendment bars plaintiff's cause of action against the state agency defendant. McGlone, supra, 2013 WL 1563265, at *3

(citing Rodgers, 29 F. App'x at 260); see also Will, 491 U.S. at 66-71; Wingo v. Tennessee Dep't of Corr., 499 F. App'x 453, 454 (6th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).

Furthermore, to the extent that plaintiff seeks to hold any defendant liable for the destruction of his property, plaintiff's claim should be dismissed. In order to assert such a claim, plaintiff must first "plead . . . that state remedies for redressing the wrong are inadequate." *Vicory v. Walton*, 721 F.2d 1062, 1066 (6th Cir. 1983). *See also Hudson v. Palmer*, 468 U.S. 517 (1984). "If satisfactory state procedures are provided in a procedural due process case, then no constitutional deprivation has occurred despite the injury." *Jefferson v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch. Sys.*, 360 F.3d 583, 587-88 (6th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, in order to state a procedural due process claim under section 1983 "the plaintiff must attack the state's corrective procedure as well as the substantive wrong." *Meyers v. City of Cincinnati*, 934 F.2d 726, 731 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting *Vicory*, 721 F.2d at 1066). A plaintiff "may not seek relief under Section 1983 without first pleading and proving the inadequacy of state or administrative processes and remedies to redress [his] due process violations." *Jefferson*, 360 F.3d at 588.

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts even remotely indicating that his remedies under Ohio law to redress the wrong of which he complains are inadequate. Plaintiff's complaint fails to explain why a state tort remedy for conversion would not suffice to address his claim. *See Fox v. Van Oosterum*, 176 F.3d 342, 349 (6th Cir. 1999). Therefore, he fails to state a due process claim that is actionable in this § 1983 proceeding.

Accordingly, in sum, because plaintiff has failed to state an actionable claim against the named defendant, the complaint should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b).

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:

- 1. The plaintiff's complaint be **DISMISSED** with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b).
- 2. The Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that for the foregoing reasons an appeal of any Order adopting this Report and Recommendation would not be taken in good faith and therefore deny plaintiff leave to appeal *in forma pauperis*. *See McGore v*. *Wrigglesworth*, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997).

<u>s/Stephanie K. Bowman</u> Stephanie K. Bowman United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written objections to this Report & Recommendation ("R&R") within **FOURTEEN (14) DAYS** after being served with a copy thereof. That period may be extended further by the Court on timely motion by either side for an extension of time. All objections shall specify the portion(s) of the R&R objected to, and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. A party shall respond to an opponent's objections within **FOURTEEN DAYS** after being served with a copy of those objections. Failure to make objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. *See Thomas v. Arn*, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); *United States v. Walters*, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).